Bridgewater Review
Volume 16 | Issue 1

Article 6

Jun-1997

Happy Birthday, Canada: Some Reflections on 130
Years of Nationhood
Andrew C. Holman
Bridgewater State College, a2holman@bridgew.edu

Recommended Citation
Holman, Andrew C. (1997). Happy Birthday, Canada: Some Reflections on 130 Years of Nationhood. Bridgewater Review, 16(1),
7-10.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/br_rev/vol16/iss1/6

This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.

-----------------

HAPPY

BIRTHDAY,
CANADA?
Some
Reflections on
130 Years of
Nationhood
Andrew Holman

O

nJuly 1,1997, many Canadians
will celebrate 130 years ofnation
hood. Other Canadians won't.
This anniversary is an important one. It
comes at a time when divisions in the Canadian polity and society are acute and
threaten the very existence of a united
country. In recent years, nationalists and
doomsday prophets alike - academics,
journalists, broadcasters, and others have reached diametrically opposed forecasts for the country's future. Will
Canada survive? Yes. But not because it
is inevitable, preordained, or fated. Not
even because it should survive. Canada
will survive because unity offers the best
of all available options for the majon"ty
ofthe country's inhabitants. Pragmatism
motivated Confederation 130 years ago;
pragmatism continues to provide the national "glue" that holds the country together.
Canada is a peculiar nation. Its identity is rooted in one fundamental paradox:
while Canadians inhabit the same geopolitical space, they do not all cling to one
common sense of nationalism, nor to one
sense of national purpose. Unlike most
countries, Canada is a nation that makes
a virtue of difference. It is one country
composed of five climatic and topographic
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regions, ten provincial and two territorial
enclaves in urban Canada emerges and regovernments, two official languages, dozemerges in public discourse with disturbing regularity.
Advocates of
ens of thriving ethnic cultures, and even
"multiculturalism" (an official governtwo national sports. While other counment policy since 1971) and stalwarts of
tries, like the United States, have convincthe traditional vision of Canada as a
ingly painted over the real socioeconomic
WAS.P. nation occasionally do battle, inand racial differences among their peoples
variably to a stalemate.
that have the potential to divide them, Canadians have chosen to recognize and
The most apparent division in
even celebrate their internal differences.
Canada, however, dwarfs all of the others.
The unofficial slogan of Canadian nationCanada is a nation rent by language. It is
alism current in the 1960s betrayed this
made up of a majority of English-speakstrange sense of being: "unity in diversity."
ers, most of whom reside in the nine provCanada has never had one unified, cominces and two territories outside of Quemon sense of nationalism, former Univerbec, and a minority of French-speakers,
sity of Toronto historian Maurice Careless
most of whom reside inside Quebec. The
argued almost thirty years ago. It has,
territorial division reinforces the linguistic one. Quebec is the ancestral homeinstead, a series of "limited identities."
The results of this tendency, charming and
land of Canadian francophones and in recommendable though they may be in the
cent years has become the object of a vokinder, gentler and ostensibly more tolercal and aggressive movement for separaant world of the 1990s, have been damagtion from the rest of Canada. Many
ing to Canada. Canadians have an idenquebecois have come to see themselves
tity crisis. Their self-image has, in Robert
as a powerless colony of English Canada,
Paul Knowles words, "a kind of indeterstigmatized by their differences in lanminacy."
Trying to define
Canadian nationalism
is akin to nailing jelly
to the wall and since
the country's founding in 1867, virtually
all efforts to do so have
foundered on the
rocks of diversity.
Limited identities have
been the source of a
number of challenges
that the country has
faced. The economic
dominance of industrial central Canada
over the West and the
Atlantic provinces has
created an enduring
cleavage between
"have-" and "havenot" regions, the results of which surface
from time to time in
political debate. Pub"HOME, SWEET HOME."
lic concern over immigration, and the spectre of growing ethnic
Canada's Entente - a depiction from the late 19th century.
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guage and culture. For them, separation
from Canada is a panacea. Free to determine their own cultural, economic, and
international policies, quebecois can
themselves become at last their own distinct and mature nation. In two provincewide referenda, in 1980 and in 1995, the
question of separation from Canada was
put to the Quebec electorate, resulting in
only a narrow defeat of the separatists' request to pursue more independence. The
current Quebec provincial government
promises another referendum, moreover,
by the year 2000. This issue, clearly, is
the most salient one now facing Canadians and, arguably, the most
serious test that Canada
and Canadian nationalism
have ever encountered.
The Quebec question
is, plainly, a political question and, not surprisingly
perhaps, discussions on
this issue have been dominated by those mavens of
all things political: journalists and political scientists.
Their discussions have
been very useful and insightful. Journalists, on
one hand, have focused
their analyses most profitably on the idiosyncracies
and personal philosophies
of the main players in this
conflict: the various Prime Ministers and
provincial premiers whose jobs it has been
to navigate through these rough waters.
Political scientists, more objective and distant, have aimed their questions at current political structures. Will Canada's
Constitution allow Quebec to separate?
Can federalism be rebuilt to satisfy
Quebec's demands? What would Canada
look like after Quebec's departure?
These are essential perspectives and
questions to consider. What they lack,
however, is context; the kind of context
(I'll state here with unabashed immodesty) that really lies only in the realm of
history. Unfortunately, Canadian historians until very recently have been AWOL
on the question of Canadian nationalism
and Quebec separation. ''At a time when

the country needed them most," historian
Michael Bliss noted in 1992, "Canadian
historians were occupied elsewhere,
studying topics and agendas not related
in the slightest way to the crisis with
which most of the nation was wrestling."
But it is in Canada's history, that perhaps
the most illuminating evidence exists for
the study of the Quebec question.
Canada is many things, but above all
it is a pragmatic country that was formed
for pragmatic reasons. This statement, as
simply put as it is; has profound meaning
for the Quebec question. The French language and culture in Canada has survived

Canadian nationalism - a "kind ofindeterminacy "

and thrived because of the efforts of
French-speakers to preserve and maintain
them, but also because it was eminently
impractical to do away with them. How
did they get into this mess? Might understanding the history of French-English
relations hold some clues to the nature of
the problem? Perhaps a little context is in
order.
The French were the first white Europeans to settle successfully and permanently in the part of North America that
became known as Canada. The voyages
of explorers Jacques Cartier (1534-35;
1541) and Samuel de Champlain (1605,
1608) laid claim to this territory for France
and set the foundations for the establishment of a formal French colony in the New
World. From 1663 until 1760, the fore-
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bears of Quebec's current francophone
population established a prosperous
economy and a series of flourishing communities on the shores of the St.Lawrence
River - New France, an official province of
France. The timing of their arrival and
the depth of their accomplishments have
important meaning in the current debate.
As the first European implant in that part
of the world, to many the French language
and culture deserve protection and its precedence must be observed.
In 1760, the aims and hopes for a
French-governed nation in North America
came crashing down heavily with the fall
of New France to the British
during the Seven Years War.
This part of the war has been
memorialized (mostly by
anglophone writers) in histories of the valiant fighting in
the Battle of the Plains of
Abraham and in Benjamin
West's famous painting of the
fallen British hero, James
Wolfe, cut down cruelly while
leading his men to victory
over the French and
canadiens. More significant
was another fact: after 1760,
Quebec - a series of settlements dotting the shores of
the St.Lawrence and numbering about 55,000 souls, 95 per
cent of them French-speaking - was now a British possession and
the French canadiens were a conquered
people.
La Conquete - the conquest of New
France - was perhaps the most significant
and formative event in Quebec history and
it bears considerable meaning for the current crisis. It ushered in the first British
effort to assimilate the French. Quebec's
first British Governor, James Murray, was
given a directive from the King to make
the colony's official language English,
outlaw the Roman Catholic Church and
French civil law, and destroy the inhabitants' traditional feudal land tenure system.
By the late 1760s, however, it became apparent that the canadiens would not be
dispossessed of their language and culture
so easily. In these years a passive resis-
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Lower Canada with its English-speaking
tance to British efforts to assimilate them
emerged, a spirit which historian Michel
neighbor, Upper Canada (now Ontario), in
Brunet dubbed fa survivance. Moreover,
a vain return to the assimilationist policy
the expected arrival of British colonists
of the early 1760s.
from Britain and New England - the tide
United into one province (the United
expected to "flood the French" - never
Canadas, 1841-1867), with one legislature
flowed. Assimilating the French, quite
and with increasing numbers of British
simply, was not practical; so much so that
immigrants arriving, surely it was only a
the British government formally reinmatter of time before English-speakers
stated the use of French language, feudal
would swamp the French, and the colony
land tenure, and French civil law through
became unicultural - right? Wrong.
the passage of the Quebec Act
in 1774. Contented with this
good judgment, the canadiens
ArctiC
Ocean
spurned in the following year
the overtures of American
revolutionaries to join them in
their quest to throw off the
yoke of British oppression.
From a very early date, the
French-speaking canadiens
and their British neighbors
and governors established and
lived under a fair and lasting
cultural entente.
It is this entente which
has weathered numerous political storms over the last two
Tata! population from 1991 census
hundred years but has surCtNdI 2'1 296 85Q
NWT.
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723900
vived, happily, because of the
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inherent pragmatic logic of
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cultural coexistence as opposed to assimilation or any
sort of "melting pot" notion.
Canada's francophone population, 1990's
In the 1830s, hundreds of
French-speaking inhabitants in Quebec
Durham and other British thinkers failed
(then called Lower Canada) took up arms
to understand the practical considerations
in rebellion against the autocratic, English
of colonial politics on the ground. Morcolonial government in an attempt to
ally, in the heady days of "democratic
wrestle more real power for their elected
rage," it would be unconscionable to gov(and largely French-speaking) legislature
ern a population (still a majority throughfrom the appointed (and wholly Englishout the 1840s) against its wishes. Practispeaking) executive branch. The rebellion
cally, with French-speakers holding over
was easily quelled but created enough con40 per cent of the legislature's seats, it
cern in the mother country to warrant a
would be virtually impossible to pass legspecial government commission, led by
islation without at least some French supJohn George Lambton, the Earl of
port. The lesson was plain. The French
Durham. "I expected to find a contest
fact had to be recognized as a permanent
between a government and a people,"
presence and incorporated into the strucnoted "Radical Jack" in his influential but
tures of political power. By 1850, governperfunctory 1839 report. "I found two
ment cabinets included French- and Ennations warring in the bosom of a single
glish-speakers, the capital city rotated bestate." His solution - a foreign solution tween French and English locations, and
was to unite the mostly French colony of
both languages were employed in public
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discourse. The entente vindicated, pragmatism once again won the day.
Even more profound and symbolic,
however, were the circumstances surrounding the birth of Canada as an independent, self-governing Dominion in
1867. Here, too, it was practical considerations, not an attachment to abstract
theory nor "universal" principles that
motivated the union of British North
American colonies into a distinct political
entity. Canada had no Paine,
no Jefferson, no Hamilton. Its
statesmen were not the clearthinking, enlightenment idealists of the eighteenth-century,
but
practical,
workmenlike managers of the
stolid mid-Victorian era.
The Dominion of
Canada was formed by the
union of three former British
colonies - New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia, and the United
Canadas. They were moved to
do so not by the "Laws of Nature" nor by reference to "selfevident truths," but by more
immediate and pressing conAt/SNit:
cerns:
a need to secure marOcean
kets and resources in a world
committed precariously to
"free trade"; and a concern for
military defence, at a time
when some American
"hawks" wished the Union to tum its army
northward after it had finished off the Confederacy and when British officials threatened repeatedly to withdraw its military
commitment to its colonies. Confederation was motivated, moreover, by political deadlock in the United Canadas: increasingly, legislators in English-speaking
Upper Canada and in French-speaking
Lower Canada each desired the freedom
to pass laws specific to their locations
without interference from the other side.
Confederation was, as such, both a
marriage and a divorce. It had the tenor,
more specifically, of an arranged marriage, and the Canadian Constitution
(passed on July 1, 1867 as the British
North America Act), unlike its American
counterpart, reads very much like a pren-

/J
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uptial agreement. It contains very little
prefatory prose, and focuses on brass tacks
- the terms of union and the specific powers granted to national and provincial
governments. With very little variation,
these arrangements were accepted by all
of the colonies that subsequently chose
to enter the marriage: Manitoba (1870),
British Columbia (1871), Prince Edward
Island (1873), Saskatchewan and Alberta
(1905), and Newfoundland (1949).
In other ways, Confederation was a
divorce. It was most apparently a practical separation agreement between Britain
and her colonies, and one that allowed for
the Dominion to exercise a good deal of
freedom. In addition, it was a formal
break-up between Lower Canada and Upper Canada, each of which became their
own separate provinces (Quebec and
Ontario, respectively) in the new Dominion. As a province, Quebec hereby gained
the means to preserve and protect its language and culture. The entente was extended and codified in the country's Constitution. And it is under these conditions
that Quebecers and Canadians have lived
ever since.
Given this background, then, what
does Quebec want? Why upset this seemingly blissful apple cart? These questions
are important ones and have baffled even
the most insightful thinkers on the subject. No one answer can be given, and for
good reason. Quebecers, as a whole, do
not want one thing; they want different
things.
Some Quebecers - an important, and
particularly vocal minority - want to be
freed of their commitments to and relationship with the rest of Canada. These
folks - the separatists - have been remarkably successful in the past thirty years in
getting out their message: French Quebec is itself a distinct nation, and for all
the guarantees of linguistic and cultural
protection it enjoys within Confederation,
their full potential as a community will
not be realized until they have established
their own separate state. In the impetuous days of the 1960s, many of these Quebecers likened their case to post-colonial
regimes in Africa and Asia, and sought
similar independence from its own "for-
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eign" oppressor; to become maftres chez
nous - masters in our own house. The
cause was appealling and gave birth in
1966 to a perennial separatist political
party - Ie parti quebecois (PQ) - which
under the guidance of its originator, Rene
Levesque and its current leader Lucien
Bouchard, became and remains the main
vehicle and the loudest champion of
French language rights. To sustain the
movement for separation, however, the PQ
has construed the situation in Quebec as
a crisis; one which must be solved now
(even though "now" has lasted over thirty
years).
Other Quebecers are not so convinced. French Quebecers and English
Canadians don't always understand one
another. That fact is clear. But most have
come to respect each other's differences.
Confederation, born of and sustained by
pragmatism, has become comfortable for
many. This sentiment has been made
plain by the many public opinion polls that
have surveyed the views of French-Canadians towards English Canada, and viceversa, with nauseous repetition since the
1960s. Some of the most recent ones report telling results. A poll in February
1996, for example, reported that almost
80 per cent of Quebecers identify themselves as Quebecers and as Canadians.
Confederation for Quebec has, moreover,
become profitable for most. More to the
point, it has been profitable for
francophone businessmen since the
1960s, and not just for the handful of
prominent entrepreneurs like Paul
Desmarais of Power Corp. but for myriad
small business owners as well. French Canadians are in control, in Quebec, of a
thriving, modem, industrial economy.
Recently, the question of Quebec's
potential secession has been referred to
the Supreme Court of Canada to test the
assumption that the province can legally
part company with Canada if it wishes
(Canada's Constitution has no formal provision for secession). The reference, however, may be moot. The current federal
government position on the issue is
straight-forward: Quebec can separate,
provided a majority of Quebecers express
the desire to do so in a clearly-worded ref-
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erendum. The wording of the past two
referendum questions was patently unclear; one in five Quebecers who voted in
favor of negotiations towards separation
had the misconception that a sovereign
Quebec would remain a province of
Canada! Eighty per cent believed that
Quebec could continue to use the Canadian dollar as its currency. If the question
is to be considered fairly, all of the cards
must be placed on the table. But when
they are, when the next referendum
comes, and it will soon, separatists will
once again be facing a formidable opposition: a body of pro-union voters and supporters ardently against separation and a
tradition, centuries old, of cultural understanding and tolerance.
History can explain many things, but
it is not a predictive art. Even so, there is
reason to have confidence in the continued unity of Canada. Educated nations,
like elephants, have long collective memories. The erasure of the long history of
cultural entente in Canada would involve
a considerable amount of whitewash, and
a rather large brush. The De-confederation of Canada is unlikely to take place
because it defies the historical logic that
has held the French and English together
in Canada for so long. These thoughts,
certainly, are the ones that I will be celebrating on July 1, 1997.
~
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